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INTRODUCTION 
Brazil has got a long tradition of considering its intermunicipal coach transport (TIPO) a 
public service, and the current Federal Constitution of 1988 (FC/1988) has adopted this 
tendency. Due to this characterization, the sector needs to be submitted to public regulation, 
audit and control. Brazilian TIPO has traditionally been run by private enterprises, subjected 
to public delegation, without public subsidies. Public management and regulation of this 
activity has been carried out by public road institutions or by public transport entities. 
However, recent reforms have changed these circumstances and many states have set up 
regulatory agencies, which still suffer lack of independence and effective power and practice. 
 
This paper points out the theoretical and legal aspects that describe this means of transport as 
a public service and shows how the sector has been managed, regulated and controlled by the 
government of some states. The analysis has indicated that the sector has gained little 
attention from the public sector. It is also shown some alternatives that might contribute to 
tackle many problems that arise from the sector. 
 
It is also shown a proposed model to be applied by auditors from the Courts of Accounts (or 
Courts of Audit) and intends to point out good regulatory practices for the TIPO sector. The 
model is based upon the learning from the Economic Regulation and the guidelines and 
experiences from the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions – INTOSAI 
and its affiliates for the development of economic regulation audits. The use of this model is 
not restricted to the courts, and other organizations, such as executive bodies and regulatory 
agencies can make use of it as well. As a basic premise it was considered the need to submit 
the sector to competitive tendering processes - in which operation performance criterion 
would be included - and thus bring competitiveness to the market and improve the service 
quality. This would force the operators to permanently seek for better efficiency and lower 
operational costs, so that the users would be the main beneficiaries from the process. 
 
Hence, this paper aims to contribute to the modernization of the sector, by presenting some 
ideas that are thought to be good practices. The model will be applied to regulations and 
institutions from three Brazilian states and analyses and comments will be developed. 
 
Brazilian Coach Transport Constitutional Framework And Its Characterization As 
Public Service 
According to the FC/1988, Brazilian intermunicipal coach transport system has been divided 
into 4 components – international (between Brazil and one of its neighbors, e.g. Argentina, 
Paraguay), interstate (between cities of different states, e.g. from Rio de Janeiro state to Sao 
Paulo state), intermunicipal stricto sensu (between municipalities from one of the 26 Brazilian 
states, e.g. from Porto Alegre to Gramado, in the Rio Grande do Sul state) and districtal 
(between cities located in the Distrito Federal - Brazilian administrative division that holds the 
federal capital, Brasilia). The difference amongst them is given by the administrative level to 
which each one is submitted. Thus, international and interstate services have been managed 
and regulated by federal bodies (FC/1998, article 21, XII, e), districtal services by bodies 
from the Distrito Federal (FC/1988, article 32, §1º), and following Brazilian constitutional 
tradition, the intermunicipal travels has been subjected to the states control (FC/1988, article 
25, §1º). The liability for urban and intramunicipal buses has lain in the municipalities 
(FC/1988, article 30, V). 
 
Given the fact that Brasileiro et al. (2001) and Gomide and Martins (2005) have already 
studied the interstate and the international services and presented papers during the 7th and 
the 9th Thredbo, respectively in Molde and Lisbon, this work draws attention upon Brazilian 
intermunicipal stricto sensu services, from now on referred as TIPO. 
 
Because the TIPO is a public service, the government holds the sector and may directly carry 
out the services or may delegate them to private entrepreneurs. By doing the latter, it has to 
comply with FC/1988 article 175, which imposes that every contract must be preceded by a 
public bid. This article is disciplined by federal law 8,987/1995, which is the first act that 
deals with the delegation issue in Brazilian whole constitutional history. 
 
Brazilian TIPO has traditionally been run by private enterprises. However, in most situations, 
the sector has not yet been adapted to the current legal framework. So, two different realities 
arise, the real and the formal, the latter pretending to display that the system functions in 
accordance with the statutory obligations, and the former showing a major gap between what 
is intended by law and what effectively occurs in the field. This dichotomy leads to an archaic 
structure that shows many failures, where competition is not a rule, but an exception. Hence, 
there is neither a free market structure nor a competitive structure stimulated by some kind of 
economic regulation. Instead, the market is comprised, in almost its entirety, by exclusive 
rights to operate and strong barriers to new operators. 
 
Besides this, in most of Brazilian states the adequate fulfillment of the services has not yet 
been achieved and the sector has faced many problems, be it for the lack of interest of the 
private companies to better their performance, or because of the government omission in 
regulating deviations from the market perfect competition model, or due to conflict of 
interests amidst municipalities, or even for the presence of the informal transport. It has also 
been noticed fall in demand and in the collection of taxes, increase of costs, paralysis of many 
routes, lack of services to less privileged towns, lack of public policy, financing deficit, and so 
on (Gifone Neto, 2002). 
 
This situation is an unbearable and has to be submitted to reforms. These changes have 
already got the necessary legal structure, but a effective political decision to take it to terms is 
still in need. It is also need the development of regulations that seek the services’ maximum 
efficiency and the social welfare. The gap between legislation and reality must be eliminated, 
and there are some institutions that might be helpful in tackling this challenge, such as the 
Court of Accounts. These bodies are responsible for controlling public expenditures and 
public services delegations, and may contribute to strengthen the role of the regulatory 
agencies, besides auditing them. 
 
Brazilian Public Administration Control 
The public administration control is commonly run by institutions with specific and exclusive 
functions. According to its position, the control may be designated as internal or external, 
depending whether it belong or not to the executive structure. This paper will focus on the 
latter, which in most situations is linked to the parliaments, audits the executive bodies and is 
generally named as Court of Accounts or Audit Office (Dromi, 2005). These bodies must 
have functional and financial independence, may develop audits through self-imposed 
initiatives - within the constitutional limits - or may get specific mandates from the 
parliaments, or still may check out eventual complaints, demands or denunciations made by 
citizens against public entities. Besides scrutinizing public organizations’ accounting, 
budgetary, financial, fiduciary and administrative activities - including public bidding 
processes - compliance with legal directives, these institutions may also evaluate the 
performance’s effectiveness, efficiency and soundness of organizations and entities under 
their jurisdiction and of governmental systems, actions and programs (Dromi, 2005; TCU, 
2007). 
 
The external control institutions usually follow two traditions: a collegiate body, inspired by 
the French Cour de Comptes model, in which the members share liabilities, and a single 
organization, headed by just one individual that carry the responsibilities, structured like 
general audit offices or general comptrollers, and adopted by countries from the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition (Barreto, 2004). Examples of the former are found in Germany, Brazil, and Spain, 
and the latter in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. 
 
The external control in Brazil is organized in accordance with the political division of the 
country. Thereby, the control exerted on federal institutions (federal government) is due to 
The Brazilian Court of Audit (TCU), and the one on regional (state governments) and local 
(municipalities) institutions are carried out by another set of bodies, comprised by twenty-six 
Regional Courts of Audit (e.g. The Rio de Janeiro State Court of Accounts, The Pernambuco 
State Court of Accounts), responsible for auditing the states and their municipalities, except 
the expenditures of the cities from the states of Bahia, Ceará, Goiás and Pará, for which there 
are other four specific Municipal Court of Accounts. There are also more two courts just to 
audit the accounts of the two biggest cities of the country (São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro) and a 
court to audit the Federal District, where the federal capital – Brasília – is placed. 
 
At international level, it is important to cite the International Organization of Supreme Audit 
Institutions – INTOSAI, an organization that was founded in Havana in 1953 by 
representatives of thirty-four countries, and objects to help its members to develop and change 
experiences and knowledge. INTOSAI is a non-political, independent and autonomous 
organization, and holds a consulting status in the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations. Currently INTOSAI has got one-hundred and eighty-six affiliates, and the TCU is 
the Brazilian representative at the institution. 
 
Building the Proposed Model 
Based upon Brazilian coach system characterization as a public service, it was developed a 
model that would assist the court of accounts in their audits, and also would be useful for 
other institutions involved with the TIPO sector. It is necessary to say that the model does not 
intend to comprise every aspect involved with the services. It aims to be more a contribution 
than an ultimate solution for every aspect related to the TIPO sector. Neither the model can be 
applied to every circumstance, given the differences of approaches and realities that arise 
from each country. 
 
Two perspectives were considered during the model development: a) it was observed the 
learning from what the Economic Regulation consider best practices, whereupon some 
parameters were established (table 1); b) it was chosen some of the INTOSAI guidelines on 
best practice for the audit of Economic Regulation (table 2). The former group was applied to 
clarify the latter, which is more conceptual and does not come to a more operational usage. 
The proposed model may be schematically as shown below. 
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Figure 1:  Proposed model scheme 
 
Regulatory best practices (theoretical) 
This sub-section exhibits the principles that guided the selection of the parameters shown in 
table 1. These elements were adopted in the development of the proposed model and inspired 
the criteria stated below in table 3. 
 
The Regulation Economics, more precisely the Economic Regulation, try to keep an 
environment of competition in markets that, by themselves, are substantially moved away 
from the model of free competition, because of market imperfections. The INTOSAI refers to 
Economic Regulation  
 
“as the exercise by the state, either directly or indirectly, of control and influence 
over suppliers, whether publicly or privately owned, of services to consumers. It 
addresses a number of objectives, some of which are in competition with one 
another, for example protecting consumers from abuse by monopoly suppliers, 
while seeking to ensure that suppliers are able to finance the provision of essential 
services, such as utilities, public transport and financial services, to specified 
standards” (INTOSAI, 2001). 
 
The regulatory rules (Orrico Filho et al., 1998) or regulatory remedies (Aragão et al., 2004) 
refer, among others, to: definition of the conditions of entrance in the markets; ways of 
contracting; suppliers' rewarding; performance and the quality indicators; definition of types 
and amounts of service; incentives to productivity and to cost reduction; tariff, price and 
subsidy policy; social control; users’ rights. 
 
The World Bank (2001) says that, when appropriately regulated, the competition best 
guaranties the efficiency of the systems of public transport and the concessions may help the 
development of low cost operations that may better the quality of the services and their prices. 
In contrast, an inadequate regulation will bring extremely harmful effects to the competition. 
 
In the same way that Brasileiro et al. (2001), Santos et al. (2001) also consider that the 
medium and long distance means of transports by coach do not have the typical nature of 
public service, given the eventual relation that happens between the user and the service, alike 
the regular one that is usual in cities and metropolitan areas. This could lead to consider them 
as a commercial activity. However, this consideration seems not to be convenient for all the 
situations. In fact, if developed countries present structural conditions that allow the displayed 
characterization, in developing countries, among which Brazil can be inserted, where large 
parcels of the population do not make use of another possibility of service beyond the road 
transport by coach, it is more appropriate to consider the activity a public service. This 
introduces the quarrel on contracts and stated periods from the regulatory point of view 
(Santos et al., 2001). Gomide and Martins (2005) share this opinion and consider that there 
are not economic rationale that would justify the submission of the sector to regulation, but 
because of other underlying reasons, such as social reasons (e.g. the need to provide services 
to the poor and to the ones who live at sparsely populated areas) and motives of national unity 
and integration, the FC/1988 has imposed public regulation to the TIPO. 
 
In the scope of this work it is considered that regulation and competition are not two 
excluding elements, and also that one should not confuse deregulation with incentive to 
competitiveness. The guiding principle of the proposed model is that the regulation comes 
indeed to allow the public sector to guarantee to the infrastructure markets – including the 
TIPO provision - a healthful and sustainable competitiveness throughout time. The 
competition not necessarily needs to be given in the field, but at the moments of entrance in 
the market - that should occurs with the highest possible frequency - which happens at the 
moment of the initial public contest and the following biddings (Smith, 2003). This tendering 
model of inducting competition is similar to the one adopted in Sweden (Alexandersson et al., 
1997). Muren (2000) remembers that processes of competitive tendering have contributed to 
reduction of costs in many sectors with a public service characterization, and the results have 
been particularly important in the bus sector. 
 
In relation to countries with poor population - as it is the case of Brazil - and mainly because 
the most users of TIPO correspond to the less favoured parcels of the population, it is 
fundamental that the applied regulatory drawings do not be limited to imported models from 
industrial developed countries. The TIPO regulatory model may follow general principles 
adopted at industrialized countries, but different approaches and emphases should be 
developed (Smith, 2003). Amongst the aspects to be considered, it could be distinguished the 
necessity not only to improve the convenience of access to the individuals who already reach 
the market, but also to extend services to the less favoured people. Concerns with the prices 
should also be considered, in a way that the poor may access the formal systems and pay for 
the services. These factors must be especially considered for the ones that live at agricultural 
areas and at towns and villages faraway from the main centres (Smith, 2003). 
 
Santos et al. (2001) also affirm that the process of modelling the delegations of the medium 
and long distance coaches depend upon where it takes place. However, a common 
characteristic may be pointed amongst the delegations’ processes: to the public power 
competes the strategic definitions (planning and designing services network, tariff policy, 
minimum standards of operation) and to the operators compete minimizing production costs 
and maximizing the attraction of passengers, through operational decisions (e.g. maintenance 
strategies, staff schedules, definition of vehicle models, timetables) (Santos et al., 2001). 
Santos and Orrico Filho (1998) add that the tactical definitions (e.g. itinerary, vehicle 
technology, frequencies and periods of operation) could be designed either to the public sector 
or to the operators, depending respectively whether the regulatory policy is more or less strict. 
 
It is also convenient to mention that Brasileiro et al. (2001) and Aragão et al. (2004) consider 
that it should be adopted less rigid regulatory strategies to the regional means ofg transport 
than to the urban modes. Besides greater decision power to the operators, competition in the 
field could be allowed, since the rights and interests of the users were respected. 
 
In order to induce the quest of better efficiency by the operators, it should be harnessed the 
contractual renewal’s possibility and the extinguishing of the delegation to the 
accomplishment or not, respectively, of performance indicators (Santos et al., 2001; Barboza, 
2002). This would induce the contracted companies to a constant search of cost reduction and 
improvement of the efficiency of the service’s fulfilment, as well as would bring a greater 
transparency of the performance of the firms (Smith, 2003). 
 
In the opposing and more radical option to regulation, Berechman (1993) considers that the 
public sector should adopt the deregulation to the non-metropolitan interurban transport. 
However, this alternative does not seem to be most appropriate to developing countries or 
nations with poor population that depend on the public transport system, as it is the Brazilian 
case. Thus, a less radical alternative could be the one suggested by Smith (2003) to countries 
with poverty: deregulation with liberalization and fall of entry barriers to new operators in 
regions not reached by the formal system. In this case, special attention in the management of 
the borders between the two markets should be taken, despite the benefits that should be 
gained by the formal system in being fed by the liberalized one. In this hypothesis it would be 
convenient to decide which kind of barriers’ loosening should be imposed: lighter or not to 
smaller operators; stricter or not to bigger operators; more conventional or not to operators 
from the formal system who eventually have became interested in these routes. 
 
As Brazilian constitution imposes the TIPO as a public service, the proper model to be 
applied would be the one similar to the one adopted at the Nordic countries, where 
competition must be stimulated not necessarily in the field, but in the moment of the 
allowances to get into the market.  
 
It can be perceived, therefore, that the strategies for a good regulation of the TIPO sector 
should pass through the adoption of competitive public bids (competitive tendering), that 
seem to be the better way to increase the competitiveness and, in result, to improve the 
efficiency of the services. In Brazil these contests must follow the rules of federal laws 
8,666/93, 8,987/1995 and the infra-constitutional legislation imposed by each state. It has to 
be pointed out that the great majority of the current permissions have not yet been submitted 
to market tests based upon this legislation, and have been legalized through the extension of 
contracts that had been established prior to the advent of the mentioned laws, that had not 
been subjected to public bidding. 
 
INTOSAI guidelines for economic regulation audits 
This sub-section presents some recommendations developed by INTOSAI Working Group on 
the Audit of Privatization (INTOSAI, 2001). These guidelines, which have also been cited by 
Marshall (2000), serve to advice the INTOSAI affiliates how to behave in their relationship 
with economic regulators and how to proceed in audits related to economic regulation, when 
checking out the efficiency and effectiveness of regulators’ actions before their tasks. The 
many Brazilian Courts of Accounts are the audit institutions (Supreme Audit Institutions – 
SAIs) that the INTOSAI makes reference, and that the TCU is one of the 186 (one-hundred 
and eighty-six) current members of the INTOSAI. The guidelines result from a survey 
conducted by INTOSAI about the proceedings taken by its affiliates when auditing the issue 
of Economic Regulation, and comprises the compilation of the information given by the 67 
(sixty-seven) respondents to the requests. 
 
In the proposed model some of the INTOSAI guidelines were not considered (e.g. 
recommendations to the functional structures of the control institutions and environmental 
aspects), in order to focus attention upon questions more related to classical regulation 
matters, mainly the ones linked to competition, entry barriers, contract term, among others. 
Thus, the selected guidelines are shown bellow, in accordance with the sections with which 
they are divided. 
 
Section 2: The Business of Regulation 
• Guideline 3 - The regulatory framework: In order to set about performance 
evaluations the SAI needs to have a clear understanding of the context in which 
the economic regulator is operating (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 4 - Objectives, functions and powers: The SAI needs to have a clear 
understanding of the objectives, functions and powers of the regulator in order to 
examine how effectively it is addressing its tasks (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 7 - Information needs: The SAI should establish whether the regulator 
is able to obtain sufficient reliable information about suppliers to enable it to carry 
out its functions efficiently and effectively (INTOSAI, 2001). 
 
Section 3: The Supply of Service 
• Guideline 9 - Security of supply: The SAI should examine the arrangements 
which the regulator has put in place to ensure that suppliers provide at least the 
basic statutory services and that consumers are compensated if failures of supply 
occur (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 10 - Consumer access: The SAI should examine how the regulator has 
sought to secure consumer access to services and whether suppliers are prevented 
from discriminating unfairly between different groups of consumers (INTOSAI, 
2001). 
• Guideline 11 - Supplying vulnerable consumers: The SAI should examine how 
the regulator monitors whether suppliers comply with their statutory duties to 
provide access to vulnerable groups (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 12 - Service standards: The SAI should examine what the regulator has 
done to establish minimum standards of service for consumers, to monitor the 
performance of suppliers, and to secure improvements when suppliers’ 
performance falls short of those standards (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 13 - Dealing with consumers' complaints: The SAI should examine 
whether regulators and suppliers have set up well-publicised procedures to enable 
consumers’ complaints to be satisfactorily addressed (INTOSAI, 2001). 
 
Section 4: The Price of Service 
• Guideline 15 - Controlling prices: Where the economic regulator has 
responsibility for controlling the prices charged to consumers by suppliers, the 
SAI should examine whether the regulator has implemented a well designed and 
transparent pricing regime in line with the regulatory objectives (INTOSAI, 
2001). 
• Guideline 16 - Linking price to quality: The SAI should examine whether the 
regulator has sought to ensure that the price consumers are required to pay is 
matched by the quality of service provided (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 17 - Encouraging supplier efficiency: The SAI should investigate 
whether the regulator has sought to encourage suppliers to reduce their costs and 
improve their efficiency (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 18 - Suppliers' financing costs: The SAI should examine whether, in 
setting price controls or other limits on suppliers' income, the regulator has 
examined the likely cost to suppliers of raising capital, including both debt and 
equity capital, having regard to factors such as the proportions of suppliers’ 
balance sheets made up by different sources of finance, and taxes on profits and 
interest (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 19 – Investment: The SAI should examine whether the regulator is 
monitoring supplier investments, checking in particular that suppliers are fulfilling 
any investment requirements and undertakings, and that the investment is having 
the desired beneficial effects for consumers (INTOSAI, 2001). 
 
Section 5: Developing Competition 
• Guideline 20 - Reducing monopoly and market domination: Where the regulator 
has the objective of promoting competition in order to reduce monopoly and 
market domination, the SAI should examine what has been done in pursuit of that 
objective and with what results (INTOSAI, 2001). 
• Guideline 21 - Promoting consumer choice: The SAI should examine what the 
regulator has done to assess whether consumers have the scope to change 
supplier, whether there is sufficient information for them to make rational 
decisions about which suppliers they choose, and whether there are effective 
arrangements for those consumers who want to change supplier (INTOSAI, 
2001). 
• Guideline 22 - Combating anti-competitive practices: The SAI should examine 
whether the regulator seeks to identify and deal promptly with alleged anti-
competitive practices (INTOSAI, 2001). 
 
 
 
The model 
As said above, the proposed model was developed in accordance with the learning from the 
Economic Regulation and the recommendations of the INTOSAI. Besides the theoretical 
aspects described above as regulatory best practices, it was applied upon the INTOSAI 
guidelines some parameters based on the studies of: a) Barboza (2002), that has analyzed 
three models - COPPETEC/GEIPOT (1995); ANTP, NTU and Fórum Nacional de Secretários 
de Transporte Urbano e de Trânsito (1999); and SEDU (2001) – and has established some 
variables that have been applied upon the regulations of 11 (eleven) Brazilian urban bus 
systems; b) Gifone Neto (2002), that has analyzed the regulation framework of 3 (three) 
Brazilian states intermunicipal coach systems; c) Orrico Filho et al. (1998), that have studied 
8 (eight) Brazilian urban bus systems. Thus, table 1 exhibits the best practice parameters from 
the Economic Regulation that were selected to be used in the proposed model. 
 
Table 1:  Best practice parameters from the Economic Regulation Theory 
 
Ref. Description 
A Organizational structure 
B Access to information from the services' fulfillment 
C Duties' definition 
D Users' rights and social control 
E Services' reach to regions outside the conventional market 
F Quantity and quality control 
G Tariff and subsidy policy 
H Incentives to productivity and to cost reduction 
I Suppliers' rewarding 
J Defining tariffs 
L Risks distribution 
M Entry barriers and access to the market 
N Competitive structure 
O Ways of contracting and delegating services (or Services contracts and 
delegations) 
P Contracts' terms 
Q Supply segmentation 
R Services' grouping 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the selected parameters from table 1 amongst the INTOSAI 
guidelines. 
Table 2:  Adopted indicators 
 
INTOSAI Guidelines Economic Regulation Parameters 
Section 2: The Business of Economic 
Regulation 
 
3 The regulatory framework A 
4 Objectives, functions and powers A 
7 Information needs B 
Section 3: The Supply of Service  
9 Security of supply C, D 
10 Consumer access D 
11 Supplying vulnerable consumers E 
12 Service standards D, F 
13 Dealing with consumers' complaints D 
Section 4: The Price of Service  
15 Controlling prices G 
16 Linking price to quality F 
17 Encouraging supplier efficiency H 
18 Suppliers' financing costs I, J 
19 Investment C, L 
Section 5: Developing Competition  
20 Reducing monopoly and market 
domination 
N 
21 Promoting consumer choice D, Q, R 
22 Combating anti-competitive practices M, N, O, P 
 
Table 3 indicates the adopted criteria that classify the regulatory practice as good, and 
corresponds to the proposed audit model that may be applied upon an intermunicipal coach 
system. An improvement of a regulation would be achieved by the alteration of its elements 
characterized as inadequate, through the introduction of the best practice, according to 
explanations from table 3. Thus, the best practice leads to an adequate regulation. 
 
Table 3:  Best practice criteria 
 
INTOSAI Guidelines Economic Regulation Parameters The adequate regulatory practice consists in: 
3 - The regulatory 
framework 
A - Organizational 
structure 
existing a regulatory agency not tied, nor playing the role that competes, to the executive branches of the government, in order 
to preserve the agency’s independence. 
4 - Objectives, functions 
and powers 
A - Organizational 
structure 
specifying and clarifying the competences of every entity, and not allowing the regulation of the sector and the regulation of the 
contracts be developed by the same institution. The former should be performed by executive bodies and the latter by regulatory 
agencies (Brasileiro et al., 2001; Amaral, 2005). 
7 - Information needs o 
B - Access to 
information from the 
services' fulfillment 
the regulator body having access to every important information regarding the operators’ actions, including the fundamental one 
to the planning and formulation of the public bidding’s terms and contracts. This information must include helpful data to the 
regulator’s survey of the carriers’ costs and to the establishment of the tender’s maximum admissible tariffs (with which the 
user might be charged). 
C - Duties' definition considering elements that define supplying obligations of the services to the operators and establish quality’s minimum patterns to the services’ fulfillment and to the operational security. 9 - Security of supply D - Users' rights and 
social control 
being established alternatives to supplying failures of the services, and also to temporary increases of demand. 
10 - Consumer access D - Users' rights and social control 
assuring the users access to the services and avoiding bias against less privileged people (e.g. the elderly, the poor and the 
disabled). 
11 - Supplying vulnerable 
consumers 
E - Services' reach to 
regions outside the 
conventional market 
existing the possibility to extend the services to less privileged places, where conventional services do not reach (e.g. because of 
little demand or difficult access). This is given by the feature of essentialness imposed to Brazilian public services by the 
Constitution. 
D - Users' rights and 
social control 
existing elements that assure reimbursement to the users as a result of operators’ failures in providing the proper services. 
12 - Service standards F - Quantity and quality 
control 
existing the establishment of performance indicators to the operators (Aragão et al., 2004), e.g. benchmarking, yardstick 
competition. These elements should reflect patterns of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness to the services’ fulfillment. 
Furthermore, the active involvement and the interaction of every actor of the process (public administration, operator, regulator, 
user) should be stimulated, in order to be achieved better services (Sousa and Lindau, 2005). 
13 - Dealing with 
consumers' complaints 
D - Users' rights and 
social control 
existing specific bodies responsible for receiving complaints and demands in consequence of operators’ misbehave or 
misconduct. 
15 - Controlling prices G - Tariff and subsidy policy 
the maximum admissible tariffs (ceiling prices) being defined by the public administration on the bidding’s terms. Bellow this 
limit the potential operators should attract users by their own price policy. 
16 - Linking price to 
quality 
F - Quantity and quality 
control 
existing effective mechanisms of field enforcement that allow knowing whether the services are being developed in accordance 
with the specifications and whether the schedules are being followed. 
17 - Encouraging supplier 
efficiency 
H - Incentives to 
productivity and to cost 
reduction 
subjecting contracts’ maintenance and renewals, tariffs’ revisions and eventual subsidies’ concessions to the accomplishment of 
performance indicators (Smith 2003). 
INTOSAI Guidelines Economic Regulation Parameters The adequate regulatory practice consists in: 
I - Suppliers' rewarding 
the operator’s remuneration being given by the tariffs. Subsidies should be avoided. Besides the tariffs, operator’s revenue 
would be constituted by fiscal incomes and by eventual associated venture (Barboza, 2002). The incorporation of alternative, 
complementary and accessory proceeds must result in tariff reduction to the benefit of users, as imposed by Brazilian 
constitution. 18 - Suppliers' financing costs 
J - Defining tariffs 
not defining the tariff by the cost plus model, which does not stimulate the efficiency and the reduction of tariffs. The main 
deficiency of the cost plus model is the impossibility of transferring the operators’ gains of productivity to the users (Gomide 
and Martins, 2005). 
C - Duties' definition 
the public administration establishing the service network. Where possible and convenient the specifications should be flexible 
to give the operators greater freedom and chance to take advantage of new opportunities. This flexibility should not be confused 
with an undesirable leniency (Barboza, 2002). 
19 - Investment 
L - Risks distribution 
attributing risks of demand and of cost to the operators. Prior to the services’ accomplishment, price realignments’ rates should 
be established on the bidding’s terms and contracts. The realignments should be applied upon contracts’ prices and not upon 
services’ input prices, in order to avoid the Averch-Johnson effect. It is necessary to say that, according to Brazilian legislation, 
operators have the guarantee of the maintenance of the contracts’ initial financial economical equilibrium. Nevertheless, inputs’ 
prices and demand’s fluctuation should not be alleged as unexpected events to justify prices’ realignments. 
20 – Reducing monopoly 
and market domination N - Competitive structure 
inducing verifications of anticompetitive practices through market dominance. The statutes should stimulate the cooperation 
amongst executive bodies, regulators, fair trading offices and competition, monopoly and merger commissions, in order to 
verify aspects related to market concentration and mergers that would mask the intention of avoiding an effective competition. 
Hence, instead of checking out the accordance with regulations of single contracts, it would be possible to conduct systemic 
analyses at regional level, in a broader scope, which would allow knowing if undesirable economic abuses are being caused by 
operators. 
D - Users' rights and 
social control 
enlightening users about rights, duties, ways of accessing services, prices and tariffs, alternative services and suppliers and how 
to access these opportunities. 
Q – Supply segmentation 
diversifying the supply and not allowing the formation of monopolies. Vertical detachment should be sought, and it would be 
helpful not delegating all the services – regular, supplementary (vans, minibuses, etc), and associate (parkings, stations, 
ticketing systems) – as a whole block. The greater the number of operators the better to the improvement of competition, 
efficiency and costs reduction. 
21 - Promoting consumer 
choice 
R - Services' grouping avoiding a single operator in the same geographical area. 
M - Entry barriers and 
access to the market 
allowing the greater number of potential entrants to tender for the public bids. In order to accomplish this purpose the entry 
barriers should be minimized and the bidding’s terms, including the criterion that defines the best proposal (which will 
determine the bid’s winner), should respect the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. 
N - Competitive structure 
establishing the competition to the market, through public bids (e.g. competitive tendering processes). When convenient and 
possible, the competition in the market would be allowed, through horizontal detachment, with fragmentation of routes and 
timetables amidst many operations instead of only one, which would result in effective competition in the field (Barboza, 2002). 
22 - Combating anti-
competitive practices 
O - Ways of contracting delegating the services in accordance with the current legislation (federal law 8,987/1995), preceded by biddings in agreement 
INTOSAI Guidelines Economic Regulation Parameters The adequate regulatory practice consists in: 
and delegating services  with the Federal Law 8,666/1993 and its alterations. 
Special attention should be given to the sub-delegations, to the transferences of delegations and to the stock controls’ transfers 
(Amaral, 2002). To the two first cases previous public bid is compulsory (as, respectively, imposed by article 26 of federal law 
8,987/1995, and by Constitution’s systemic analysis of article 27 of federal law 8,987/1995 in association with article 175 of 
FC/1988). The third situation does not require previous public biddings, however the possibility of transfer has to be foreseen 
on the contests’ terms in order to permit posterior approval of the transference by the public power. 
The extinguishing of the delegation only can be given by one of the forms foreseen in the law 8.987/1995. 
Additional care has to be given to eventual modifications of the contracted services, in order to prevent that the alterations do 
not deprive of the characteristics of the contractual object, and also do not mask the attempt of escaping from the constitutional 
rule of the previous contest. 
P – Contractual stated 
periods 
providing successive rounds of public biddings, after short contractual stated periods. The contractual term should be 
sufficiently long so that the operator may recoup its invested capital and short enough so that the competition for the market 
(competitive tendering) may be established again. 
Santos et al. (2001, our translation) have stated that the periods should be “approximately defined to be equivalent to the 
optimal cycle of the vehicle’s assets (that is, to reflect the minimum average cost of utilization of the fixed capital in vehicles)”. 
Here it should be considered not only the contractual stated period, but also the eventual contract’s renewal, that should be 
harnessed to the compliance with performance indicators (Santos et al., 2001; Barboza, 2002). 
It should be remembered that the shorter the contractual stated period, and the stronger the enforcement (fiscalization, control, 
performance analysis) of the regulation, the bigger the concerns of the operator with the improvement of the efficiency and with 
the reduction of costs will be. In another words, the longer the stated periods, and more lenient the enforcement, the weaker is 
the competitiveness and the bigger is the trend to cartelization, with consequential higher risks to the system (Santos et al., 
2001). 
The Swedish experience recommends stated periods between 3 and 5 years (Alexandersson et al., 1997), and it should reach a 
maximum of 7 years, including eventual renewals, harnessed to performance analyses (Santos et al., 2001). The European 
Commission (2001) also recommends a five-year stated period for contracts deriving from public bidding processes. 
An Application of the Model 
This section summarizes the analyses developed upon regulations and institutions related to 
the TIPO sector from the Brazilian states of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and Santa Catarina. These 
cases were chosen because some activity done by the Court of Accounts of these states was 
detected. Despite the interstate transport be managed by federal bodies, the examination was 
also extended to this component, due to a more intense activity developed by the TCU upon 
the sector than the ones exerted by the state courts. As the interstate and the intermunicipal 
modes have almost the same characteristics, virtually differing only on the administrative 
level to which each one is submitted, the TCU would not be ignored. Figure 2 shows a 
Brazilian map, where the selected states can be better identified. 
 
Table 4 presents concise results of the comparative analyses made amidst the four selected 
systems. As the model presents 16 guidelines, and 25 clarifying parameters, it is not viable to 
discuss every result that arose from the investigation. Thus, it was decided to focus attention 
in this paper upon the aspects more related to competition, i.e., guideline 22 (Combating anti-
competitive practices), parameters M (entry barriers and access to the market), O (ways of 
contracting and delegating services) and P (Contractual stated periods). 
 
Table 4:  Comparative analyses 
 
Selected Brazilian States  
INTOSAI Guidelines 
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 
Federal 
Government Bahia Rio de Janeiro 
Santa 
Catarina 
3 – the regulatory 
framework A 8 8 8 8 
4 – objectives, 
functions and power A 8 * 8 * 8 8 
7 – information needs B 9 9 9 9 
C 9 * 9 * 9 * 9 * 
9 – security of supply 
D 9 9 9 9 
10 – consumer access D 8 9 * 9 8 
11 – supplying 
vulnerable consumers E 8 * 8 * 9 * 9 
D 9 * 9 * 9 * 9 * 12 – service standards 
F 8 * 8 8 8 
13 - dealing with 
consumers' complaints D 9 9 * 9 9 
15 – controlling prices G 8 * 8 8 * 8 
16 – linking price to 
quality F 9 9 9 9 
17 - encouraging 
supplier efficiency H 8 * 8 8 8 
I 8 * 8 8 8 18 – suppliers’ 
financing costs J 8 * 8 * 8 8 
C 9 8 * 9 9 * 19 - investment L 8 * 8 8 8 
20 - reducing 
monopoly and market 
domination 
N 9 * 8 * 8 * 8 
D 9 * 9 * 8 * 8 * 
Q 8 8 8 8 21 - promoting consumer choice R 8 8 8 8 * 
M 9 * 8 8 8 * 
N 9 8 8 * 8 * 
O 9 * 8 * 8 * 8 * 
22 - combating anti-
competitive practices 
P 8 * 8 * 8 8 * 
Legend: 9: good practice; 8: inadequate practice 
 
There are some situations with both good and inadequate practice being observed in the same 
guideline. These cases are signalled with a (*) and are due to the selected regulations show 
some good aspects based on table 3 criteria, even when not entirely in accordance with the 
stated best practice. However, for the purpose of this paper, it was decided to cite only the 
practice that is the most representative to the guideline. This will define how the parameter 
has been considered, according to the proposed model, after a balance between the pros and 
cons of their rules. 
 
Parameter M: entry barriers and access to the market 
Brazilian federal law 8,987/1995 has adopted two species of delegation - concessions and 
permissions - and the difference between them lies in the requirements for the adoption of 
each mode, the former being more demanding than the latter. For instance, the concession 
mode does not allow individuals tendering, and only admits established companies or 
consortia to participate in public bids. Both modes are formalized through contracts, but if the 
public administration perceives the necessity to extinguish the services (e.g. due to operator 
misbehave or service non completion) it would be easier to do on the permissions, and the 
compensations might be smaller. 
 
When analyzing table 4, it can be observed that a good practice was stated only to the federal 
government level. This is because this is the system in which the permission is the only 
adopted specie of delegation. The three state regulations impose the concession as a general 
rule to the most of their routes (sometimes the permission is the adopted mode to particular 
situations) and, by doing this, individuals have been excluded from the systems and entry 
barriers have been raised. Besides other implications, this might mean losing some 
opportunities in tackling the problem of supplying vulnerable consumers (e.g. because of little 
demand or difficult access). Other barriers have been imposed, as cited below: 
 
• The regulations of the state of Bahia: 
• demand that the potential entrants possess at least three vehicles in accordance 
with the state regulatory agency specifications in order to apply to public bidding 
processes; 
• establish as criteria to define the best proposal the entrant tradition in providing 
similar services and the length of routes that the company already serves by the 
time of the bids; 
• allow other factors, besides the tariff value, to define the bidding’s winner, such 
as: administrative and financial potential, size of the fleet and plants, fixed assets; 
• demand that the vehicles to be employed on the services must be registered in the 
state of Bahia; 
• The regulations of the state of Rio de Janeiro require that a potential entrant must 
have a specific purpose, in order that one applying to conventional services can 
not address other segments (special, private transport, school transport); 
• The regulations of the state of Santa Catarina: 
• establish that at public biddings, upon the same conditions, incumbent operators 
will be given preference against potential entrants; 
• fix as criteria to define the best proposal: I – the company already be an operator 
of any station intercepted by the route under contest; II – the entrant be 
established in one of the terminals of the route; 
• determine as bidding’s casting vote criteria: I – the headquarters’ bidder be 
established in the state of Bahia; II – the company have already got any 
permission to operate in the system; III – priority to the contender that already 
operate the longer extension of section over the route in dispute; 
• demand that the potential entrants possess at least two vehicles in order to apply to 
public bidding processes. 
 
Parameter O: ways of contracting and delegating services 
As said before, the article 175 of Brazilian FC/1988 imposes that every public service 
delegation must be preceded by a public bid. The regulations of the three analyzed states 
comply with this requirement regarding the concessions, likewise the federal regulations 
concerning the permissions. However, the state regulations do not respect the constitutional 
principle when dealing with the permissions, since the need to previous bid is loosened, and 
the operators may be directly given the delegation, without being submitted to competition. 
 
Another problem that arises from the four regulations is the possibility of permission and 
concession transferences from established operators to other companies, without being carried 
out public biddings. Besides masking the real intention of avoiding an effective competition, 
this practice also wounds the constitutional principle of prior bidding to any new public 
service contract. 
 
Parameter P: Contractual stated periods 
The contractual stated periods have consisted in one of the biggest barriers to the realization 
of public biddings throughout the whole country. By alleging respect to old contracts, that had 
been established prior to the current FC/1988 and to its infra-constitutional legislation (federal 
law 8,987/1995 and the federal and state specific regulations) and that in most situations had 
never been preceded by public contests, incumbent firms have been perpetuated without being 
submitted to market tests through public bids. Besides this, even when the contractual period 
has already come to a term, very few biddings have been carried out, being it for the 
governmental omission in putting the sector in accordance with the new rules, or due to 
operators’ collusion in refusing to participate in the contests that have been carried out, as 
suggests a bidding process in the state of Bahia that resulted desert in consequence of absence 
of any potential entrant. The lack of biddings has guided the contracts to be directly renewed, 
what has compromised the competition. 
 
It has to be said that some contests have been developed following the rules established after 
the FC/1988. But even in these cases the new contractual periods that have been adopted can 
not be considered an adequate regulation practice, given their lengths. The regulations do not 
determine that the periods should be determined after the development of economical and 
financial feasibility studies. Instead, they impose periods that seem to be very long, and that 
may be renewed too, without being submitted to new tests of market nor having to comply 
with performance indicators. Table 5 shows the periods allowed by each regulation. 
 
Table 5:  Contractual periods authorized by each analyzed regulation 
 
Selected Brazilian States 
Contract 
Federal 
Government 
(permission) 
Bahia 
(concession) 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
(concession) 
Santa 
Catarina 
(concession) 
Initial 15 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 
Renewal not allowed 10 years 10 years 10 years 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed model does not intend to deplete every Economic Regulation issue regarding 
the TIPO sector. Indeed, it is an attempt to contribute for a better management of a sector that 
has not had enough attention from the public authorities, nor has been submitted to biggest 
academic studies. It has to be strengthened that the proposal, although addressed to the Courts 
of Accounts’ applications, can also be used by other interested parties in the subject. 
The developed studies intended to add the learning from the Economic Regulation to the 
recommendations of the INTOSAI, and the most relevant finding is the evidenced necessity 
of opening the sector to competition, what could be accomplished through the planning and 
development of procedures alike to competitive tendering processes. This practice, in spite of 
already being inserted in the national juridical framework, effectively has not been put on 
terms, and monopolies have been perpetuated in the provision of the services throughout the 
diverse states of the Brazilian federation. 
 
Despite the fact that the use of competitive tendering processes to every situation has been 
criticized and put in doubt, and other ways of contracting have been discussed (Hensher and 
Wallis, 2005), the Brazilian case is still at an anterior stage if compared with other countries 
where major reforms have already been put on the transport agenda. Here, initial rounds of 
competitive tendering, at a broder level, have yet to be initiated, and this seems to be the most 
difficult task to be faced. It has to be remembered that the sector has traditionally been run by 
private enterprises, without public subsidies, and imposing these companies to competition is 
urgent. Moreover, by the time of the specifications of the public biddings’ terms, it would be 
the best opportunity to establish performance indicators to be obeyed by the future operators. 
It has to be remembered that, given the current constitutional framework, other ways of 
delegating services, such as negotiated performance-based contracts, would require major 
constitutional reforms. 
 
The informal transport has disputed shares of market with the formal systems and needs to be 
brought to legality. This would benefit the sector, given the addition of new possibilities to 
the services’ provision, with consequent increase of the system’s robustness and greater 
attendance of the users’ necessities. Other important factors stressed by the model are the 
accountability in the management of the services and the need to address trustworthy 
information to the users, as well as the existence of specific bodies responsible for receiving 
claims and complaints. 
 
Hence, the developed analyses show that reforms at infraconstitutional level are in need, and 
the sate regulation regarding the TIPO provision has to seek a modern pattern. The proposed 
model, and the Court of Accounts role in auditing the sector, may awake the government to 
the urgency of giving the sector better care and attention. 
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